In the context of networking, research has focused on non-cooperative games, where the selfish agents cannot reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the infrastructure. Many approaches have been proposed for mitigating the typically inefficient operating points. However, in a growing number of networking scenarios, selfish agents are able to communicate and reach an agreement. Hence, the degradation of performance should be considered at an operating point of a cooperative game. Accordingly, our goal is to lay foundations for the application of the cooperative game theory to fundamental problems in networking. We explain our choice of the Nash bargaining scheme (NBS) as the solution concept, and introduce the price of selfishness (PoS), which considers the degradation of performance at the worst NBS. We focus on the fundamental load balancing game of routing over parallel links. First, we consider agents with identical performance objectives. We show that, while the price of anarchy (PoA) here can be large, through bargaining, all agents, and the system, strictly improve their performance. Interestingly, in a two-agent system or when all the agents have identical demands, we establish that they reach social optimality. We then consider agents with different performance objectives and demonstrate that the PoS and PoA can be unbounded, yet we explain why both measures are unsuitable. Accordingly, we introduce the price of heterogeneity (PoH), as an extension of the PoA. We establish an upper bound on the PoH and indicate its further motivation for bargaining. Finally, we discuss network design guidelines that follow from our findings.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Motivation
T RADITIONAL communication networks were designed and operated with systemwide optimization in mind. However, it has been recognized that systemwide optimization may be an impractical paradigm for the control of modern networking configurations. Indeed, control decisions in largescale networks are often made by various agents independently, according to their individual interests, and Game Theory [1] provides the systematic framework to study and understand their behavior. To date, game theoretic models have been employed in virtually all networking contexts. These include control tasks at the network layer, such as flow control Manuscript (e.g., [2] ), routing (e.g., [3] - [6] ) and multicasting as well as numerous studies on control tasks at the link and MAC layers. Moreover, the application of Game Theory to communication networks has extended beyond control tasks. For example, several studies considered game theoretic scenarios in the context of the creation and evolution of the network topology. Others considered game theoretic scenarios at other layers, e.g., numerous studies in the context of network security (see [7] and references therein) and a large body of work on peer-to-peer applications.
Research to date has mainly focused on non-cooperative networking games, where the selfish decision makers (i.e., the players, or agents) cannot communicate and reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the network infrastructure. Moreover, the main dynamics that were considered were Best-Reply, i.e., each player would observe the present state of the network and react to it in a self-optimizing manner. Accordingly, the operating points of such systems were taken to be some equilibria of the underlying non-cooperative game, most notably, Nash equilibria.
Such equilibria are inherently inefficient [8] and, in general, exhibit suboptimal network performance. As a result, the question of how bad the quality of a Nash Equilibrium is with respect to a centrally enforced optimum has received considerable attention e.g., [6] , [9] , [10] . In order to quantify this inefficiency, several conceptual measures have been proposed in the literature. In particular, the Price of Anarchy (PoA) [9] , defined as the ratio between the system (social) performance at a (worst) Nash Equilibrium and the corresponding optimal system performance, has become the de facto benchmark for measuring the performance of non-cooperative networking games.
It has been repeatedly observed that the value of the PoA is typically large, often unbounded and many approaches have been proposed for mitigating this problem. These include schemes for resource provisioning [11] , Stackelberg strategies for controlling part of the traffic [12] , [13] , incentive schemes for cooperation or cost sharing among mobile terminals [14] , [15] , schemes for choosing the initial configuration [16] , [17] , schemes for exercising limited control on the game dynamics [17] and numerous proposals for pricing mechanisms. Some studies also considered players to be "partially altruistic" [18] . Nevertheless, in all the above studies, the standing assumption has been that the network agents play a non-cooperative game.
However, there is a growing number of networking scenarios where, while there is competition among self-optimizing agents (i.e., a "game" among "selfish players"), there is also a possibility for these agents to communicate, negotiate and reach a binding agreement. Indeed, in many scenarios the competition is among business organizations, which can, and 1063-6692 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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often do, reach agreements (e.g., SLAs) on the way that they provide, consume or share the network resources. The proper framework for analyzing such settings is that of Cooperative Game Theory [1] . Such a paradigm transfer, from noncooperative to cooperative games, calls to revisit fundamental concepts. Indeed, the operating point of the network is not an equilibrium of a non-cooperative game, but rather a solution concept of a cooperative game. Accordingly, the performance degradation of such systems should be considered at the new operating points. It is also important to note that the (typically high, often unbounded) Price of Anarchy is a price that is paid not only due to the selfish nature of the decision makers, but also due to their inability to cooperate; when the latter becomes possible, we need a measure that accounts for the price that is paid solely due to the selfishness of the network agents. The goal of this paper is to lay foundations for the application of Cooperative Game Theory to fundamental problems in networking. We focus on the Nash Bargaining Scheme (NBS) [1] as the solution concept for cooperative networking games. As shall be discussed, per bargaining problem, the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the NBS is guaranteed under mild conditions. Accordingly, we introduce a novel concept for measuring the effect of cooperation, termed as the Price of Selfishness (PoS). Taken as the ratio between the system (social) performance under the (worst) Nash Bargaining Scheme and the corresponding optimal system performance, the PoS quantifies the loss incurred by agents solely due to their selfish behavior.
B. Previous Work
Cooperative game theoretic models and solution concepts (and the NBS in particular) have been considered in the context of networking by a few studies. In [19] , the NBS is used to distribute jobs fairly among servers, while in [20] it is used to allocate bandwidth fairly among users. In [21] , the NBS is implemented to improve the fairness and efficiency of traffic engineering and server selection. In [22] , network formation is addressed through the use of cooperative game theoretic tools such as the Shapley Value [1] and the NBS. There, it is numerically shown that the NBS permits to allocate costs fairly to users within a reasonable computation time. In [23] , the NBS is used to calculate the subgame perfect equilibrium and provide upper-bounds for the PoA. In [24] , coalition games and the Shapley Value are used to maximize the utility framework for routing and flow control in ad-hoc networks. In [25] a modified version of the NBS is used to set fair prices between ISP and CP's in a nonneutral network.
Cooperative Game Theory and the NBS in particular, have also been used in spectrum sharing [26] , where nodes in a multi-hop wireless network need to agree on a fair allocation of the spectrum. In [27] , a bargain-based mechanism is proposed for message passing in participatory sensing networks, in order to encourage cooperative message trading among the selfish nodes. In [28] , a coalition game model with a stable solution is proposed in order to investigate the performance gain of multiple communities in delay tolerant networks.
In [29] , the design of new coalition-based dynamics is investigated in the context of cognitive radio networks. In [30] , a network synthesis game is studied, in which individual access networks with insufficient resources form coalitions in order to satisfy service demands. There, the Core [1] of the game is investigated for several payoff allocations among the players. In [31] , various cost allocation schemes are studied for players that have the option to join coalitions of multicast services in a wireless network. We also note that there is a body of work on network bargaining games, e.g., [32] and references therein; however, in those studies a "network" describes some relations among general economic agents.
Most related to the present paper, a previous study [33] proposed the Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA) as a measure that considers the degradation of performance when some collaboration among the agents is possible. The SPoA is defined similarly to the PoA but considers only strong (rather than all) Nash equilibria 1 ; however, since such equilibria are not guaranteed to exist (in particular, we indicate they do not in the framework considered in this paper), it cannot provide a general benchmark that would be the "cooperative games counterpart" of the Price of Anarchy.
C. Our Contribution
We concretize our study by considering the setting of routing in a "parallel links" network. Beyond being a basic framework of routing, this is the generic framework of load balancing among servers in a network. It has been the subject of numerous studies in the context of non-cooperative networking games, e.g., [3] , [5] , [9] , [13] , [34] , to name a few. In particular, in [3] it has been established that, under a noncooperative routing game and under some standard modeling assumptions, the system has a unique Nash Equilibrium. We begin by considering the case where N agents aim at optimizing the same type of performance objective, e.g., each tries to minimize its traffic delay. This is the classic setting on which the literature has focused, in particular whenever considering the Price of Anarchy. We demonstrate that, in the considered routing game, the degradation of system performance at the Nash Equilibrium can be very large. Yet, we establish that, for an interesting class of performance functions, the N -player bargaining problem related to our routing game, is essential, i.e., if the network agents are allowed to bargain and reach a binding agreement (while remaining selfish), each agent is guaranteed to strictly improve its performance. Consequently, the PoS is strictly smaller than the PoA. Interestingly, when N = 2 or when all N agents have identical demands, the PoS is equal to 1; that is, by letting the agents bargain, no loss in system performance is incurred due to their selfishness. On the other hand we provide an example where N > 2 and show that 1 < P oS < P oA. For this case it remains an open question how to tighten the bounds on the PoS.
We then extend our study to address the case where agents consider vastly different ("heterogeneous") performance objectives and demonstrate that the corresponding N -player bargaining game is not necessarily essential. We then show that the PoS, and also the PoA, can be unbounded. However, we explain why both measures may be unsuitable for such heterogeneous scenarios. Accordingly, we introduce an additional measure, termed the Price of Heterogeneity (PoH), and indicate that it is a proper extension of the PoA for the heterogeneous setting. We establish an upper-bound on the PoH for a quite general class of (heterogeneous) performance objectives, and indicate that it provides incentives for bargaining also in this, more general case. Finally, we discuss some network design guidelines that follow from our findings.
The main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows:
• We introduce the Price of Selfishness as a figure of merit for network (or system) performance under a cooperative game. • We establish that, in the game of routing over parallel links and for interesting classes of "homogeneous" performance objectives, the N -player bargaining problem is essential, i.e., all agents strictly improve their performance, and the PoS is strictly smaller than the potentially large PoA. Moreover, when N = 2 or when all N agents have identical demands, the PoS is equal to 1. • We indicate that, in the wider case of "heterogeneous" performance objectives, the N -player bargaining problem is not necessarily essential and we show that the PoS can be arbitrarily large. • We introduce the Price of Heterogeneity (PoH) as a proper extension of the PoA for the heterogeneous case and establish an upper-bound on the PoH. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate the model and terminology. In Section III we consider the classic case of homogeneous performance objectives. The heterogeneous case is treated in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section V. Due to space limits, some proofs and technical details are omitted from this version and can be found (online) in [35] .
II. MODEL AND GAME THEORETIC FORMULATIONS
A. Model
Following [3] , we are given a set N = {1, 2, . . . , N} of selfish "users" (or, "players", "agents"), which share a set of parallel "links" (e.g., communication links, servers, etc.) L = {1, 2, . . . , L}, interconnecting a common source node to a common destination node. See Figure 1 . Let c l be the capacity of link l. Each user i ∈ N has a traffic demand r i .
A user ships its demand by splitting it over the links L, i.e., user i decides what fraction of r i should be sent through each link. We denote by f i l , the flow of user i ∈ N on link l ∈ L. Thus, user i can fix any value for f i l , as long as f i l ≥ 0 (non-negativity constraint) and l∈L f i l = r i (demand constraint). Denote the total demand of all the users by R, i.e., R = i∈N r i . We assume that the system of parallel links can accommodate the total demand, i.e., we only consider capacity configurations c = [c 1 . . . c L ] for which l c l > R. Turning our attention to a link l ∈ L, let f l be the total flow on that link i.e., f l = i∈N f i l ; also, denote by f l the vector of all user flows on link l ∈ L, i.e., f l = (f 1 l , f 2 l , . . . , f N l ). The routing strategy of user i, f i , is the vector
The (routing) strategy profile f is the vector of all user routing strategies, f = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f N ). We say that a user's routing strategy is feasible if its components obey the nonnegativity and demand constraints and we denote by F i the set of all feasible f i 's. Similarly, a routing strategy profile is feasible if it is composed of feasible routing strategies and we denote by F the set of all feasible f 's.
The performance measure of a user i ∈ N is given by a cost function J i (f ). The aim of each user is to minimize its cost. As in [3] , the following standard assumptions on the cost function J i of each user are imposed: S1 J i is the sum of link cost functions i.e.,
l is a function of two arguments, namely user i's flow on link l and the total flow on that link. In other words:
it is a function of two arguments. We assume that whenever J i l is finite,
is strictly increasing in each of the two arguments.
Cost functions that comply with the above assumptions shall be referred to as Standard. An N -tuple of positive values J = (J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J N ) is said to be a feasible cost vector if there is a feasible (routing) strategy profile f ∈ F such that,
An important class of problems is when users are interested in the same performance measure, e.g., delay (i.e., each user aims at optimizing the delay of its traffic). In fact, much of the current literature on networking games has focused on this class, e.g., [4] - [6] , [9] , [34] , [36] , [37] . In this case, the performance of a link l is manifested through some function T l (f l ), which measures the cost per unit of flow on the link, and depends on the link's total flow. For example, T l may be the delay of link l. Specifically, we consider users whose cost functions assume the following, "homogeneous", form:
H3 T l (f l ) is strictly increasing and convex.
H4 T l (f l ) is continuously differentiable.
where the function T (·) is independent of the link entity, but it is a function of the residual capacity c l − f l . Moreover, T (c l − f l ) is strictly increasing in f l . Cost functions that comply with the above assumptions shall be referred to as homogeneous. Note that homogeneous functions are necessarily standard. We note that, for homogeneous functions, we have
is the average delay per unit of flow, then the corresponding homogeneous cost function is the widely used total delay function (in our case, per user); by dividing the latter by the traffic demand we obtain the traffic's average delay. Finally, we note that the technical Assumption H5 holds for interesting classes of cost functions, such as link delays under the M/M/1 queueing model, where
As a result of Assumption H5, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For any two links l, n it holds that
Proof: See [35] . We order the links such that ∀l < n, c l ≥ c n , i.e., ∀l < n, ∀f , T l (f ) ≤ T n (f ). Hence, Assumption H5 effectively implies a "quality" ordering of the links. In the rest of the section, cost functions shall be assumed to be just "standard", unless explicitly referred to as "homogeneous".
B. Game Theoretic Formulation
We distinguish between two cases, namely noncooperative and cooperative game scenarios, as follows.
1) Noncooperative Routing (Load Balancing) Game: In this case, the standard solution concept is the Nash Equilibrium [1], i.e., a routing strategy profile such that no user finds it beneficial to change its flow on any link. Formally, a feasible routing strategy profilef = (f 1 ,f 2 , . . . ,f N ) is a Nash Equilibrium Point (NEP) if, for all i ∈ N , the following condition holds:
It follows from our assumptions on standard cost functions that the minimization in (1) is equivalent to the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions: for every i ∈ N there exist a (Lagrange multiplier) λ i such that, for every link l ∈ L,
The KKT conditions as stated above constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for a feasible routing strategy profile to be an NEP. In [3] , the following has been established:
Theorem 2: In a network of parallel links (as defined above), where the cost function of each user is standard, there exists a routing strategy profile that is an NEP and it is unique. 2 For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , denote byĴ = (Ĵ 1 , . . . ,Ĵ N ) the cost vector at the (unique) Nash Equilibrium.
2) Cooperative Game: The Nash Bargaining Scheme (or, Nash Bargaining Solution) is a main solution concept in Cooperative Game Theory [1] . Due to its appealing properties, such as its existence and uniqueness for each bargaining problem (under mild conditions), it has been widely applied to cooperative scenarios. Accordingly, we adopt it as our solution concept for the cooperative version of our routing game (and, more generally, for networking games).
Informally, a "bargaining scheme" proposes a cost vector that induces a strategy profile that the players agree to play. In the context of the Nash Bargaining Scheme, a standard assumption (see [1] ) is that the agreement may consist of choosing between a finite number of strategy profiles, according to given (agreed) probabilities. Then, the players would play the game according to the chosen (pure, in our case) strategy profile. This is the standard way to cope with a certain convexity requirement, as explained in the following.
Formally, a bargaining scheme proposes a cost vectorg that can be represented as the convex combination of some feasible cost vectors, i.e.
is termed the bargained probability vector andf (m) for m = 1 . . . M, are termed bargained strategy profiles (if their choice is not unique we pick them arbitrarily). The set of all suchg is denoted by G. A bargaining game is defined by a set of (bargainable) costs G, as defined above, and by a disagreement point v. The disagreement point is a (feasible) cost vector that corresponds to the costs that would be paid by the players if they do not reach an agreement. As is usually done, we consider it to be the cost vector that corresponds to the (unique) NEP, i.e., v =Ĵ, [1] . Then, an N -player bargaining problem is defined as follows: Definition 3: An N -player bargaining problem consists of a pair (G,Ĵ), where G is a closed convex subset of R N ,Ĵ is a vector in R N and the set G {(g 1 , . . . , g N ) | g i ≤Ĵ i ∀i} is nonempty and bounded. An N -player bargaining problem is essential if and only if there exists at least one cost vector g for which g i <Ĵ i , ∀i ∈ N .
It is easy to verify that the routing game considered in this study meets the mathematical requirements of an Nplayer bargaining problem. However, it is not clear this problem is also essential, i.e., that every user stands to strictly lower its cost through bargaining. In Sections III and IV we will show that, under homogeneous costs, the N -player bargaining problem related to our routing game, is essential, while under standard costs this may not be the case.
We note that, in general, the convexity requirement imposed on G in Definition 3 is necessary for obtaining the structural result of the following Theorem 4. Allowing players to bargain a random selection of the strategy profile is the standard (and often only) way to obtain such convexity (see [1] ). Nonetheless, we shall show that the results of this study can also be obtained when considering the more restricted (and more practically appealing) case in which no randomization is allowed and one bargained strategy profile should be chosen.
Given an N -player bargaining problem, a Nash Bargaining Scheme (NBS) is a cost vectorg =g(G,Ĵ) = (g 1 , . . . ,g N ) that satisfies the following axioms [1] , [38] : N1 Individual Rationality: For 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,g i ≤Ĵ i ; i.e., no player will incur a higher expected cost than at the disagreement point. If 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,g i <Ĵ i , we say that this axiom is strictly satisfied. N2 Pareto Optimality: If ∃ g ∈ G such that, for some i, g i <g i then for some k holds that g k >g k ; i.e., there is no way to reduce the expected cost of a player without increasing the cost of another player. N3 Symmetry: For any two players i, k, 
i.e, a linear transformation of the utility function (being a transformation that maintains the some ordering over preferences) should not alter the outcome of the bargaining process. N5 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For any closed convex set S, if S ⊆ G andg ∈ S, theng(G,Ĵ) = g (S,Ĵ); i.e., removal of "uninteresting" strategy profiles should not alter the outcome of the bargaining process. In [1] , the following has been established: Theorem 4: For every N -player bargaining problem there exists a unique solution (i.e., NBS)g that satisfies all five axioms (N1)-(N5), and it is provided by:
Therefore, under mild conditions, a cooperative game always admits a solution in the form of an NBS, which is unique in terms of the proposed cost vector.
C. System Optimization
As commonly assumed in the literature (e.g., [5] , [6] , [9] , [12] , [13] , [16] , [17] , [39] ), the welfare of a system is measured by the sum of the individual costs of the players, i.e., by a ("social") cost function J sys defined as J sys = i∈N J i . 3 Note that players with the same cost functions and traffic demands are indistinguishable in the sense of this axiom.
We denote by J * sys the optimal value of the system's cost, i.e., the minimal value of J sys over all feasible routing strategy profiles. In addition, we denote byĴ sys the value of the system cost at the (unique) NEP. In the case of homogeneous cost functions, we have:
For example, if T l (f l ) stands for the link's delay, then J sys corresponds to the total delay experienced by the system's traffic. Note that, for homogeneous costs, J sys depends only on the total flows on the links. Accordingly, for such costs, we denote by f * = (f * l ) l∈L the optimal vector of link flows, i.e.,
Similarly,f = (f l ) l∈L is the vector of link flows at the NEP andĴ
is the system's cost at the NEP. Also, for an NBS with disagreement pointĴ, bargained probability vectorp and strategy profilesf(m) for m = 1 . . . M,f(m) = (f l (m)) l∈L are the corresponding vectors of link flows, and
is the expected social cost at the NBS.
The following lemma establishes that, for homogeneous cost functions, both at the system optimum and at the Nash Equilibrium, the costs of the links monotonically increase with the link index, i.e., "better" links bear lower costs.
Lemma 5: With homogeneous costs, ∀l, 1 ≤ l < L, the following hold:
Proof: See [35] . Furthermore, the following lemma establishes that there exists a 'threshold link', in the following sense.
Lemma 6: There exists a link M ∈ L for which:
. Proof: Assume by contradiction that there is no such link M . We can split this into three (exhaustive) cases:
. In [35] , we establish that each case leads to a contradiction.
D. Prices of Anarchy and Selfishness
DefineĴ as the set of all cost vectors that correspond to a Nash equilibrium. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) [9] is defined as
Note that, in our routing game, there exists a unique NEP [3] , with social costĴ sys . Hence, in our setting, the PoA is defined as
For quantifying the degradation of performance under a cooperative game scenario, i.e., solely due to the selfish nature of the decision makers, we introduce the following concept. Definition 7: The Price of Selfishness (PoS) is the ratio between the worst expected social cost of any Nash Bargaining Solutiong(G,Ĵ), for which the disagreement point is a NEP, and the optimal social cost, i.e.,
Due to Theorem 2, in our routing game,Ĵ, is unique. We denote the social cost of the unique NBS of the bargaining game (G,Ĵ), asJ sys . Hence, the Price of Selfishness in our game is defined as
Due to the axiom of Individual Rationality (N1), the PoS is never higher than the PoA and potentially could be much lower. The difference between the two is an issue of major importance, as it indicates how much gain (if at all) is accomplished by allowing the decision makers to bargain and reach binding agreements.
III. HOMOGENEOUS COSTS
It is well known that the Price of Anarchy can assume large values and in Section III-B, we present a generic example within our framework, for which the PoA is unbounded. However, we proceed to establish that, such deficiency of performance can be mitigated through bargaining. Specifically, we show that, with homogeneous costs, the Nash Bargaining Scheme strictly improves the system's performance, and strictly lowers the cost of each individual user, unless of course P oA = 1, in which case P oS = P oA = 1.
In order to establish that the Nash Bargaining Scheme strictly improves the performance of every user, we constructively design a strategy profileḡ, whose corresponding cost vector strictly satisfies Axiom N1, i.e., ∀i,ḡ i <Ĵ i . This effectively proves that our N -player bargaining problem is essential. It then follows from Theorem 4 that the NBS strictly lowers the system's cost, compared to the system costs at the Nash equilibrium.
Our goal is to bring forth an initial feasible routing strategy profile,f , and constructively adjust it by exchanging flow between users, such that its corresponding cost vector will strictly satisfy Axiom N1. Initially, definef as the routing strategy profile where all the users send their flow proportionally with regard to the system optimum, namely:
The corresponding users' costs thus equal 4 :
From (12) it is clear that the users send their aggregated flow such that it equals the system optimum, yet this does not imply that Axiom N1 is strictly satisfied. Specifically, we need all the users to strictly lower their costs with respect to the NEP. However, when sending flow according to (12) , it may happen that some users increase their cost in comparison to the NEP. Therefore, we specify a process (algorithm), where users exchange flow between themselves, such thatJ strictly satisfies Axiom N1, while maintaining system optimality. Note that exchanges of flow between users shall not affect the aggregated flow on each of the links, hence the system optimum is still reached after each exchange.
DefineḠ i Ĵ i −J i . We divide the users up into two sets. One set (Ḡ + ) contains the users with a lower cost at J i (f i l ,f l ), compared to the NEP, i.e., k ∈ G + ifḠ k > 0. The complementary set (G − ) contains the users with a higher or equal cost atJ i (f i l ,f l ), in comparison to the NEP, i.e., k ∈ G − ifḠ k ≤ 0. From (13), the following holds:
where the left side of (14) equals the optimal system cost and the right side equals the system cost at the NEP. From (14) we derive that:
and from (13) and (15) it follows that:
Inequality (16) indicates that the overall gain from the users in G + exceeds the loss of the users in G − . This implies that there can be an exchange of flow between users in G − and G + , which translates into a exchange of cost, such that all users will end up in G + , in which case Axiom N1 is strictly satisfied. However, in order for a user m ∈ G − to lower its cost and end up in G + , another user k ∈ G + and a pair of links l, n has to be found, such thatf k l > 0,f m n > 0 and T l (f * l ) < T n (f * n ). The following lemma proves that, as long as G − is not empty, such a user k and links l, n necessarily exist.
Lemma 8:
In the game defined in Section II, with homogeneous costs, consider instances for which the P oA > 1. Assuming G − is nonempty, there always exists a tuple (m, k, l, n) with users m ∈ G − , k ∈ G + and links l, n, such thatf k l > 0,f m n > 0 and T l (f * l ) < T n (f * n ). Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that no such tuple can be found. This implies that ∀m ∈ G − , ∀k ∈ G + , ∀l for whichf k l > 0 and ∀n for whichf m n > 0, it holds that T l (f * l ) ≥ T n (f * n ). 5 Thus, from Lemma 5, there exist two links L 1 , L 2 , L 1 ≤ L 2 , such that all users in G − send their flow on links l = 1, . . . , L 2 , all users in G + send their flow on links l = L 1 , . . . , L, and for any two links l, n, L 1 ≤ l, n ≤ L 2 it holds that T l (f * l ) = T n (f * n ). Without loss of generality we can exchange flow between any users m ∈ G − , k ∈ G + , on links L 1 ≤ l ≤ L 2 , such that after this exchange all users in G − send their flow on links l = 1, . . . ,L, and all users in G + send their flow on links l =L, . . . , L for some link L 1 ≤L ≤ L 2 . This exchange will not affect their cost. Seeing that the aggregated flow of all the users continuously brings about the optimum, it follows that: 
hence:
Note that we consider Case 1, thus f * l ≥f l ≥f + l for l > M. It follows from Lemma 5, Lemma 6 and (19) 5 Since the P oA > 1, from (16), it is straightforward that G + is non-empty. that:Ĵ
The first inequality follows from Lemma 5, the second follows from Lemma 5 and (20) and the last inequality follows from Lemma 6. IfĴ + ≤J + , it implies that ∃k ∈ G + , for which G k ≤ 0, which is a contradiction to the definition of G + . Thus, Case 1 is not possible.
and consider a new routing strategy profile h, where for any l ∈ L, h l =f l . Moreover, at h, all users in G − send their flow on links l = 1, . . . , K and all users in G + send their flow on links l = K, . . . , L for some K ∈ L. In other words, the aggregated link flows at h are equal to the aggregated link flows at the NEP, however at h, the users in G − send all their demand on the links with the lowest cost per unit of flow. Since M ≥L it follows from Lemma 6 that K ≤L ≤ M . To prove the lemma for Case 2 it is sufficient to establish thatJ − <Ĵ − , which leads to a contradiction. We first prove that i∈G − J i (h) ≤Ĵ − , whereafter we establish
Since ∀l, h l =f l , we can transform h into the NEP by repeatedly switching flows between the users in G − and G + until all users in G − send their demand according tof − and since ∀l, h l =f l , all users in G + send their demand according tof + . Note that the aggregated link flow during this process stays constant, thus it is clear that at every stage, users in G − will only increase their cost by sending more flow on lower links, while users in G + only decrease their cost by sending more flow on the higher links. Therefore, i∈G − J i (h) ≤Ĵ − .
We continue to establish thatJ − ≤ i∈G − J i (h). Consider a different network, linksL = 1, . . . ,L and total demandR =
We consider two different routing strategy profiles in this new network. The first is its system optimum, which we denote by g * . The second is the strategy profile where an amount of [f * L − f − * L ] is sent on linkL and the rest of the demand, R − , is sent according to h. Thus, due to the optimality of g * :
However, from the KKT conditions (2), it follows that for any link l ∈L, g * l = f * l . Hence, from (22) we get thatJ
Thus,J − ≤ i∈G − J i (h) and consequently,J − ≤Ĵ − . IfJ − <Ĵ − , then ∃k ∈ G − , for whichḠ k > 0, which is a contradiction to the definition of G − . Now considerĴ − =J − . SinceL ≤ M , it follows from (22) and the definition of g and h that for any link l ≤L, T l (f l ) = T l (f * l ). Moreover, K =L. Consequently, according to Case 2 and 3 in Lemma 6, it follows that ∀l, n ∈ L, T l (f l ) = T l (f * l ) and, the Price of Anarchy equals 1, which is a contradiction to the conditions of the lemma. Thus, Case 2 is not possible either. We therefore conclude that there always exists a tuple (m, k, l, n) such as described in the lemma, unless G − is empty.
In the following lemma, we establish a process (which, in fact, is a computationally efficient algorithm), which finds tuples and exchanges flow between users such that all users will end up in G + .
Lemma 9: In the game defined in Section II, with homogeneous costs, consider instances for which the P oA > 1. There exists a bargained strategy profile, which equals the system optimum and strictly satisfies Axiom N1.
Proof: Lemma 8 shows that we are always able to find a tuple (m, k, l, n), unless G − is empty and all users are in G + , in which case Axiom N1 is strictly satisfied. After finding such a tuple, user m ∈ G − exchanges flow with another user k ∈ G + , thereby lowering its cost until one of the following events occurs:
We choose as a threshold, whereafter k refrains from exchanging its flow.
Unless G − is empty, each time one of the events 1-4 occurs, a new tuple can be found as explained in Lemma 8. Furthermore, from the strict inequality of (16) it follows that there is enough cost to be transfered from users in G + to users in G − , such that, for a small enough , all users will end up in G + . We therefore establish the following algorithm that increments over the links l ∈ L and finds tuples (m, k, l, n) until G − is emptied.
Denote l + as the link for which ∃k ∈ G + such thatf k l + > 0 and ∀l < l + , ∀i ∈ G + it holds thatf i l = 0. Likewise, define l − as the link for which ∃m ∈ G − such thatf m l − > 0 and ∀l > l − , ∀j ∈ G − it holds thatf j l = 0. In the first step, set l + = 1 and l − = L. When two users m, k are found, such as described in Lemma 8, they exchange flow till one of the events 1-4 occurs. Afterwards, a new tuple (m , k , l + , l − ) is found for users m , k .
When no user k ∈ G + can be found on link l + , we increment the link number such that l + ⇐ l + + 1. The algorithm now looks for a tuple (m, k, l + + 1, l − ). Similarly, when no users m ∈ G − can be found on link l − , we decrement the link number, such that, l − ⇐ l − − 1. The algorithm then looks for a tuple (m, k, l + , l − − 1). Once l + = l − , no such tuple can be found, hence, by Lemma 8, G − is empty. Furthermore, the algorithm completes within a final number of steps (as formally established by Proposition 11 that follows).
After the algorithm, the set G − is empty and we obtain a cost vector that strictly satisfies Axiom N1. Furthermore, during every step of the algorithm the aggregated flow on the links is equal to the flow at the system optimum.
We are now able to state the following theorem. Theorem 10: In the game defined in Section II, with homogeneous costs, consider instances for which the Price of Anarchy is strictly larger than 1, i.e., P oA > 1.
1) The corresponding N -player bargaining problem is essential. 2) At the outcome of the NBS, each user strictly decreases its cost. Thus, Price of Selfishness is strictly smaller than the Price of Anarchy (P oS < P oA). Proof: In Lemma 9 we established a bargained strategy profile,f , whose cost vector is socially optimal and strictly satisfies Axioms N1. This completes the first claim of the theorem. Since the corresponding N -player bargaining problem is essential,
and as a result of Theorem 4 it follows that for the Nash Bargaining Solution,g,
Thus, at the NBS each user strictly decreases its cost and from (4), it follows that P oS < P oA, hence establishing the second claim of the theorem.
Note that, since this cost vector is socially optimal, it also satisfies Axiom N2 (Pareto Optimality). Thus, the scheme described in the proof of Lemma 9 effectively constitutes an efficient algorithm for computing a cost vector that satisfies Axiom N1 and Axiom N2.
Proposition 11: Given the NEP, the process described in Lemma 9 is an O(N · L) algorithm for computing a feasible cost vector which satisfies Axioms N1 and N2.
Proof: See [35] . According to Theorem 10 it follows that all users (and the system), stand to gain from bargaining. However, it remains an open question as to how much the cost of the system is reduced. In the following sections we will show that, for certain instances, through bargaining, the users bring the system to optimality, thereby completely overcoming the deficiency implied by their selfish behavior. Specifically, we shall establish that in a 2-user system as well as in an N -user system where all users have equal demands, the NBS brings about the social optimum, i.e., P oS = 1.
A. Two Users
In this section we consider a system that consists of two users, i.e., N = 2. We denote the two users in the system as i and j. We show that, with homogeneous costs, the Nash Bargaining Scheme always (i.e., with probability 1) brings the system to its social optimum. Moreover, we will establish that this is done through a single bargained strategy profile, chosen with probability 1. Thus, through bargaining, the deficiency of the network at the NEP can be overcome entirely. In order to achieve this, we constructively design a bargained strategy profile, whose corresponding cost vector is socially optimal and, at the same time, complies with Axioms N1-N5. Thus, it follows from Theorem 4 that this cost vector is the unique solution of the NBS. We then choose this bargained strategy profile with probability 1, hence the PoS is always equal to 1.
As a result of Lemma 9, there might exist a range of systemoptimal cost vectors for which Axioms N1 and N2 are satisfied. However, we focus on a particular cost vector that is system optimal and also complies with Axioms N3-N5. To do this, we first exhaustively describe the set of all cost vectors that satisfy Axiom N1. Denote this set as G N 1 ⊆ G. We then focus on a specific cost vector within this set. The following lemma describes two instances of system-optimal cost vectors for which Axiom N1 is only weakly (i.e., not strictly) satisfied. Hence, these cost vectors lie on the boundary of G N 1 .
Lemma 12: For any user k, there exists a system-optimal routing strategy profile,f , for whichJ k ≥Ĵ k .
Proof: We consider user i, since the proof is symmetric for user j. At the NEP, we split the links into two sets: L + = {l ∈ L|f j l ≥ f * l } and L − = {l ∈ L|f j l < f * l }. Now, consider a new routing strategy for user i,f i in which it "fills" up the links in L − according to the system optimum, starting from link L upwards. After the filling process user i reaches a link, K ∈ L − for whichf i K ≤ f * K −f j K and for any link l > K, l ∈ L − ,f i l = f * l −f j l . At the new routing strategy,f i , i's cost is equal to
The inequality follows from (1) . We now change the routing strategy of user j and construct a flow (f i ,f j ) that is system optimal and for which
By doing so we have constructed a feasible optimal routing profilef for which J i (f ) ≥Ĵ i , hence proving the lemma. We define the strategyf j as follows. On any link l ∈ L, j sends an amountf j l such thatf j l +f i l = f * l . Since for any link l,f i l ≤ f * l , this new routing strategy is feasible. On any link l ∈ L − , l > K, j does not increase its flow, i.e.,f j l =f j l . Furthermore, on link K,f j K ≥f j K . As a result,
Hence, from (24) and (25), With Lemma 12, we can now exhaustively describe G N 1 . Lemma 13: The set of cost vectors that satisfy Axiom N1 is equal to a triangle with vertices at (Ĵ i , J * sys −Ĵ i ), (J * sys − J j ,Ĵ j ) and (Ĵ i ,Ĵ j ). (See Figure 2) .
Proof: From Lemma 12, it is immediate that the cost vectors x = (Ĵ i , J * sys −Ĵ i ), y = (J * sys −Ĵ j ,Ĵ j ) and z = (Ĵ i ,Ĵ j ) all lie in G N 1 . Moreover, since G is convex, the three edges (x, y), (x, z) and (y, z) also lie in G N 1 . For any cost vector g that lies on (x, z) or (y, z), Axiom N1 is weakly satisfied. Moreover, since g i + g j ≥ J * sys for any g ∈ G, the edges (x, z) and (y, z) describe the boundaries of G N 1 . Finally, the edge (x, y) is equal to the line g i + g j = J * sys where g i ≤Ĵ i and g j ≤Ĵ j . It is straightforward that any cost vector outside the edges of the triangle either does not satisfy Axiom N1 or is not feasible.
After describing G N 1 , we now make use of the remaining Axioms N2-N5 to identify a specific cost vector in G N 1 which is equal to the unique NBS.
Lemma 14: Consider the bargaining problem (G,Ĵ). The Nash Bargaining Solution,g(G,Ĵ), corresponds to the feasible, system-optimal cost vector for whicĥ
Proof: From Axiom N1, we know thatg(G,Ĵ) ∈ G N 1 . Since G N 1 ⊆ G, from Axiom N5, it follows that
Thus, in order to prove the lemma, it suffices to look at the bargaining problem (G N 1 ,Ĵ) . Now consider the linear transformation of G N 1 such that
After the transformation, the vectors x, y,Ĵ from Lemma 13, correspond to respectively, (0, J * sys −Ĵ sys ), (J * sys −Ĵ sys , 0) and (0, 0). Thus, the bargaining problem (Ḡ N 1 , (0, 0) ) is symmetric for both users and according to Axiom N3, g i (Ḡ N 1 , (0, 0) ) =g j (Ḡ N 1 , (0, 0) ). Moreover, from Axiom N2, g(Ḡ N 1 , (0, 0) ) lies on the Pareto frontier ofḠ N 1 , i.e., the edge (x −Ĵ, y −Ĵ), henceg i (Ḡ N 1 , (0, 0) ) +g j (Ḡ N 1 , (0, 0) 
Due to Axiom N4, g(G N 1 ,Ĵ) = (g i (Ḡ N 1 , (0, 0) ) +Ĵ i ,g j (Ḡ N 1 , (0, 0) ) +Ĵ j ), hence,
Finally, from (26) and (27) it follows thatĴ i −g i (G,Ĵ) = J j −g j (G,Ĵ) andg i (G,Ĵ) +g j (G,Ĵ) = J * sys . As a result of Lemma 14, we are able to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 15: In the game defined in Section II, with homogeneous costs and N = 2, the Price of Selfishness equals 1. Moreover, the outcome of the NBS is always (i.e., with probability 1) socially optimal.
Proof: As a result of Lemma 14, we have established a bargained strategy profile, whose cost vector is socially optimal and complies with Axioms N1-N5. 6 Henceforth, we can choose the constructed bargained strategy profile, with probability 1. Therefore, the Price of Selfishness is equal to 1 and the unique solution of the Nash Bargaining Scheme is always (i.e., with probability 1) socially optimal.
According to Theorem 15, it is certainly worthwhile for both players, and for the entire system, to send their demands according to the NBS. Nevertheless, this result does not automatically extend to a system with more than two players. From Theorem 10, we know that all N -players strictly benefit by sending their demand according to the NBS, but system optimality is not guaranteed. Indeed, the following example brings a case in which N > 2 and the NBS is not socially optimal.
Example 16: Consider a network of three users and two parallel links. The demands of the users are r 1 = 0.1, r 2 = r 3 = 7.45 and the costs of the users equal
for i = 1, 2, 3. According to Theorem 4, we can find the NBS, by maximizing (Ĵ 1 − g 1 )(Ĵ 2 − g 2 )(Ĵ 3 − g 3 ) for any g ∈ G.
However, it follows thatf 1 = 11.17 < f * 1 . Hence, the NBS does not bring the system to its optimum.
From the above example together with Theorem 10 we conclude that for a general case of N -players, where N > 2, it holds that 1 < P oS < P oA. It remains an open problem to tighten the bounds of the PoS. Nevertheless, there exists other cases in which, for the general case of N -players, the NBS is system optimal, as will be shown in the next section.
B. Identical Users
In [35] , we provide a generic example of a two-link network, where all users have equal demands and the users' costs hold by Assumptions (H1-H4). In the example, we show that the PoA is unbounded by splitting the aggregate traffic demand among an increasing number of users. In contrast to the unbounded PoA, the PoS will always be equal to 1 in these settings, as will be established in the next theorem.
Theorem 17: Consider the game defined in Section II, where r i ≡ R N , ∀i ∈ N, and the users' costs satisfy Assumptions H1-H4. For the corresponding N -player bargaining problem, it holds that:
1) Any solutiong that satisfies Axioms N2 and N3, is unique.
2) The Price of Selfishness is always (i.e., with probability 1) equal to 1. Proof: Assume by contradiction that there exist two distinct bargained cost vectors, g, h, which both satisfy Axioms N2-N3. Since all users have equal demand, it follows from [3] that, all users receive equal costs at the NEP. Axiom N3 states that all users should then receive equal costs at the NBS. Thus, for any two players i, j ∈ N , g i = g j and h i = h j . Assume w.l.o.g. that i∈N g i > i∈N h i . Consequently,
However, by switching from g to h, all users decrease their expected cost, which is in contradiction to Axiom N2. Thus, any bargained cost vector that satisfies Axioms N2-3, is unique. This establishes the first part of the lemma.
In the same way as (12) , we define a bargained strategy profilef , where users send their flow proportionally to the social optimum of the system: ∀ i∈N ,l∈Lf i l = r i R f * l . Similar to (13) , the corresponding users' costs are:
By combining the first part of the theorem together with Theorem 10, it follows that, any cost vector that satisfies Axioms N2-3 is equal to the unique NBS. Thus, in order to demonstrate that the constructed bargained strategy profile also brings about the NBS, it remains to verify that it satisfies Axioms N2 and N3. N2 From (29) , it follows that the aggregated flow on the links brings about the optimum. By definition, the system optimum is Pareto optimal. N3 From (29) it is clear that all users receive equal costs at the NBS, therefore Axiom N3 is satisfied. Thus, for the case where the users' costs abide by assumptions H1-H4, we have constructed a cost vectorJ, which satisfies Axioms N1-N5 and is equal to the system optimum. We can now choose the proposed bargained strategy profile with probability 1, therefore the PoS is always (with probability 1) equal to 1.
Note that, Theorem 17 relates to any bargaining scheme that satisfies Axioms N2 and N3. Aside from the Nash Bargaining Solution, this includes many other solutions, such as the egalitarian solution or when N = 2, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (see [1] ).
C. Weighted Social Cost
As mentioned, our focus lies on a social cost that is the sum of the users' costs, which is the common practice in the literature. Yet, it is of interest to examine the sensitivity of the PoS to the choice of the social cost. To that end, we turn to consider a case where, while the costs of the users are homogeneous, the social cost assumes a more general structure.
Specifically, suppose that, from a system point of view, the performance of the users should not be treated equally. Namely, for each user i, there is a coefficient (weight) α i > 0 that captures the relative importance of its performance. As these are relative weights, we set i∈N α i = 1. The social cost is then: J sys = i∈N α i · l f i l T l (f l ). Note that J sys stays convex. We term the above as a weighted social cost and denote the Price of Selfishness of the non-weighted social cost as P oS.
Proposition 18: In the game defined in Section II, with homogeneous costs and with a weighted social cost, the Price of Selfishness is bounded by
Proof: See [35] . As a result of Proposition 18, we get the following corollary. Corollary 19: In the game defined in Section II, with two users or with N identical users, with homogeneous costs and with a weighted social cost, the PoS is upper bounded by,
IV. COPING WITH HETEROGENEITY
A. Unbounded PoS
It is of interest to consider the difference between the PoS and PoA also within the wider class of standard functions. The following result establishes that there are instances where such a difference does not exist and moreover, both the PoS and the PoA may assume arbitrarily (and identically) large values. Consequently, in such cases, the N -player bargaining problem is not essential.
Theorem 20: In the game defined in Section II, with standard costs, the corresponding N -player bargaining problem may not be essential, i.e., the NBS may coincide with the NEP. Moreover, the Price of Selfishness (hence, also the Price of Anarchy) can be arbitrarily large.
Proof: We establish the claim through the following example. Consider a network with two users and two parallel links and let the total demands be r 1 = r 2 = 0.5. The costs of the users are defined as follows:
where 0 < < 0.1. It can be verified that, at the NEP, both users ship all of their flow through link 1. Therefore, their costs at the NEP are given byĴ 1 = 0.5 andĴ 2 = 0.5 . We first need to verify that it is not profitable for any of the users to flow on the bottom link at the NBS. This has to hold for any bargained probability vectorp.
Consider M feasible cost vectors J(f(m)), m = 1 . . . M and denote the flows of the users 1 and 2 on the bottom link as, respectively, x m and y m .
The individual costs of the users at the cost vectors J i (f (m)), m = 1 . . . M, i = 1, 2 are equal to:
We have to show that none of the players use the bottom link at the NBS, i.e. the NEP coincides with the NBS. Due to Axiom N 1 (Individual Rationality), the following should hold
From (31), the cost of the first user can be written as
The following inequality now follows from (32) and (33), for all j = 1, 2, . . . , M:
whereĴ 1 = 1 2 . In the same way, we get for the second user
whereĴ 2 = 0.5 . Thus, we obtain for the second user ∀j = 1, . . . , M m\j p m
Thus, it holds that ∀j = 1, . . . , M:
Simplifying the above, we get ∀j = 1, . . . , M:
By substracting (34) from (35) we obtain:
Since, by definition,p m > 0 for all m = 1, 2, . . . , M, (36) can hold only if x m = y m = 0, for all m = 1, 2, . . . , M. Hence, we establish that at the Nash Bargaining Scheme, the players will only use the top link. This also shows that the Nash Equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Therefore, the NBS in this case coincides with the NEP (i.e. the PoS equals the PoA).
Consider now the following (feasible) flow profile: f 1 1 = 0, f 1 2 = 0.5, f 2 1 = 0.5, f 2 2 = 0. The corresponding social cost is equal to 1.5 + 0.5 0.5+ , i.e., smaller than 2.5. Therefore, the social optimum is no more than 2.5. Thus:
Hence, the PoS and the PoA can be made arbitrarily large by choosing a sufficiently small . More generally, it is interesting to note that, due to the axiom of Individual Rationality, whenever the Nash Equilibrium is Pareto optimal (as in the above example), the Price of Selfishness equals the Price of Anarchy.
B. The Price of Heterogeneity
Theorem 20 is not surprising. Indeed, with nonhomogeneous costs, each user may be trying to optimize completely different performance objectives. Hence what might be "good" for one might be "bad" for the other, in which case there is little hope for bargaining. Moreover, with heterogeneous objectives, a social objective that is some simple combination of the individual cost functions, e.g. their sum, may be artificial. This implies that the Prices of Anarchy and Selfishness, which are based on the definition of such a social cost, may be inappropriate. Hence, for the heterogeneous case we need to look for an alternative concept for benchmarking the deterioration of performance due to the competition among players.
To that end, consider again the example in the proof of Theorem 20. To achieve social optimum, user 1 would need to sacrifice its performance and also use link 2. However, that link is also costlier for user 1 (albeit not to the extent it is for user 2), hence, both at an NEP and at an NBS, user 1 would stick with link 1. Now, suppose we optimally routed all of the traffic (of both users), but considering as the target, the cost function of user 2. In that case, the (socially) optimal solution would coincide with the NBS (and the NEP), i.e., all traffic routed over link 1, with an optimal (arbitrarily large) cost value of 1 . Hence, the problem here is not due to selfish behavior but rather due to the poor performance of the network, as seen from the perspective of user 2. The above discussion suggests that, with heterogeneous users, the deterioration of performance in the game scenario should be measured through the following question: how much might the performance of a user deteriorate, due to the selfish behavior of the other users, with respect to the case where all the traffic would be optimally controlled according to its own cost function. This figure measures the price that a user pays for the plurality of performance objectives.
Definition 21: For a user i with a (standard) cost function J i , the system cost function perceived by user i, denoted by J i sys , is the cost function obtained when applying J i to the whole of the system traffic R = j∈N r j .
For example, consider a user i that attempts to minimize its delay, where T l (f l ) stands for the link delay. Then, J i = l∈L f i l · T l (f l ), whereas J i sys = l∈L f l · T l (f l ). However, J i and J i sys are not comparable. In the above example, J i is the total delay experienced by a volume of traffic of size r i , whereas J i sys is the total delay experienced by a (larger) volume of traffic of size R. Rather, the figures that should be compared are the respective performances of each unit of traffic, i.e., we should normalize J i and J i sys by the respective volumes of traffic r i and R. Indeed, in the above example, this would compare between the respective average delays, namely 1 r i · l∈L f i l · T l (f l ) and 1 R · l∈L f l · T l (f l ). We thus define:
Definition 22: The normalized cost of a user i is the ratio between its cost J i and its size r i , namely: 1 r i · J i . Similarly, the normalized system cost perceived by user i is the ratio between J i sys and the total size of the system R, namely: 1 R · J i sys . Note that Definition 21 implicitly assumes that there is a way to define the system cost of a game through the cost function of a specific user. While this is a valid assumption in many classes of games, there are cases, such as zerosum games, where it is not. Moreover, Definition 22 is only applicable to games where there exists a way to measure the size of the players, e.g, number of items, budget. In the realm of routing games, the size of a player refers to its flow demand. We are now ready to define our proposed concept for quantifying the degradation of performance in the heterogeneous case.
Definition 23: The Price of Heterogeneity of a user i ∈ N (P oH i ) is the ratio between the normalized cost experienced by that user at a (worst, if many) Nash Equilibrium and the optimal value of the normalized system cost perceived by that user, i.e.,
where J i * sys is the minimum value of J i sys , namely J i * sys = min f ∈F J i sys . Similarly, the Price of Heterogeneity (PoH) is the worst value of the P oH i , i.e.:
We proceed to establish an upper-bound on the PoH for the class of routing (load balancing) games specified in Section II, considering the general (and, potentially "highly heterogeneous") class of standard functions. Theorem 24: In the game defined in Section II, with standard costs, the following hold: a network administrator, the system may perform better if users have identical demands.
V. CONCLUSION
We investigated the added value of bargaining among players in a communication network. As a new figure of merit for cooperative games, the Price of Selfishness was introduced and under the case of homogeneous costs, the NBS guarantees an improvement in performance for all users and for the system. Moreover, for certain cases, the NBS was shown to be equal to the optimal (social) solution of the system. It remains an open question how to tighten the bounds on the PoS for the general case with N -users. We also considered the case of non-homogeneous costs, for which we proposed the Price of Heterogeneity as an appropriate extension of the Price of Anarchy and established an upper bound on the PoH under quite general conditions.
Our study focused on load balancing (routing) among servers (links), and furthermore, it considered a specific solution concept, namely the NBS. Yet, we believe that it provides useful insight into the potential merit of adopting bargaining schemes in networking games. For example, having PoS ≡ 1 but potentially PoA 1 in certain homogeneous settings, together with a potentially unbounded PoS in non-homogeneous settings, suggests a design guideline that attempts to separate among homogeneous groups of users (e.g., "highly delay-sensitive", "less delay-sensitive but highly sensitive to packet loss", etc.) so that each group would share its own network resources. Another important issue is the ability, or willingness, of the users to bargain. The essential bargaining solution concept implicitly assumes that, as long as Axiom N1 is met, the players would accept the solution. Yet, some users might not be able to do so, either due to technical reasons (e.g., inability to communicate) or to other reasons, such as administrative or legal constraints. Such a user, even if "homogeneous" in terms of its cost function, may prevent achieving social optimality through bargaining. Therefore, another design guideline would be to try to separate between cooperative users (i.e., that can engage in bargaining) and those that do not cooperate. Furthermore, if such isolations are not possible and we need to confront a heterogeneous scenario, our bound on the PoH suggests that homogeneous groups of users would benefit from bargaining a joint strategy.
While we advocated the choice of the NBS, other solution concepts of cooperative games should be considered, as they could better fit some of the networking scenarios. For example, agents may have different bargaining powers, hence asymmetric bargaining schemes [1] might be called for. In addition, the NBS contemplates two scenarios, namely a grand coalition versus a "disagreement point". Yet, partial coalitions should also be taken into account, e.g., due to the inability of some users to engage in bargaining. Finally, we aim to consider more complex topologies, which correspond to a larger range of networking scenarios. Investigating the added value of bargaining in such contexts is thus another important area for future work.
